The accident at Three Mile Island highlighted the need to make improvements in nuclear power plant instrumentation. Since the accident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has required the installation of new equipment aimed at improving both post accident monitoring capability and the operator/equipment interface.
Replacement of some existing equipment with qualified, highly reliable sensors and processing equipment will satisfy many of the new requirements.
But implementation of other requirements will be more difficult. New measurement techniques must be developed or use of new technologies must be judged acceptable for safety purposes before some instrumentation needs can be satisfied. The lack of commercially available equipment has caused reassessment of the importance of other instrumentation needs.
Looking beyond those modifications needed to correct deficiencies discovered as a result of the TMI experience, improvements in the reliability of normal plant operating equipment should be considered to reduce the frequency of safety system challenges.
Advanced i nstrumentation presently available or under development may be useful in identifying equipment degradation, thereby preventing major equipment failures and consequent plant upsets.
There is also a need for better diagnostic tools for improving the operator's response capability following plant upsets. Some of these tools are now available but others which show considerable promise require more development effort.
Introduction
In the nineteen months since the TMI event, the Commission has required modifications affecting most aspefts of nuclear power plant design and operation. Not surprisingly, many of these requirements call for improvements in instrumentation.
While we have already implemented many reasonably simple changes, over the next two years we expect to make substantial modifications. But to do so, we will have to solve some difficult technical problems. We must also resolve what appear to be conflicting needs and goals.
In the first portion of my talk will discuss some examples of new that we believe are needed and point difficulties which have hindered this morning, I instrumentation out some of the impl ementation.
In the time remaining, I will offer you some of my own views on where we go from here. An important lesson learned from the TMI experience was that neither NRC nor the industry had been doing a (lood job of applying advanced technology to improve nuclear power plant safety. In the past several years, there have been significant advances in instrumentation designs and concepts which could be applied to enhance safe operation. I While there are demonstrated techniques available for this purpose, the ruggedness of this instrumentation is questionable. This instrumentation would be expected to meet safety grade requirements and, therefore, would be required to be both environmentally and seismically qualified. As we recognized that compliance with these requirements will be difficult, this instrument has not been included in the guide.
Operator-Process Interface
As I mentioned earlier, the TMI event and studies which followed clearly identified the need to change the design of nuclear power plant control rooms to improve the operator's capability to respond to plant upsets. Since the event, there have been many references both in the scientific literature and in the press to the thousands of alarms, switches and displays which the operators must -rely on to assess plant conditions and take mitigating actions.
No one questions the validity of these criticisms --the need for prompt action to correct control room display and arrangement problems is obvious to anyone who has spent any time in an average power reactor control room. There i s, however, considerable question as to timing of actions to be taken and the degree to which they might complement improvements which might be implemented later.
Safety Parameter Display System
One of the major modifications related to operational displays which the Commission has required be installed at all nuclear power plants is a Safety Parameter Display System. The purpose of this system is to provide the operator with a continuous display, at one point in the control room, of the safety status of the plant. While not intended as a diagnostic system, it must be capable of displaying trends in important variables to allow control room operating personnel to assess plant status rapidly. It is expected that the operating personnel will rely primarily on normal control room instrumentation in taking subsequent mitigating action and monitoring the effectiveness of these actions.
There is general agreement within industry that such a display system is needed. Yet considerable debate continues on how complex the system should be and on the basic design requirements that should apply. For example, there were those who argued that a hardwired display system that was reasonably simple and collected signals from a limited number of sensors was desired as it could be installed quickly. However, we were of the view that use should be made, where a licensee desired, of the more sophisticated information-processing capability provided by process computer technology and we have relaxed our implementation schedule for this item to help promote that application.
Draft design guidelines for this and other emergency support facilities required by the Commission were published for public comment in July of this year. We are not requiring redundancy, but instead believe that the processing and display devices should be of proven high quality and reliability with the total system designed to achieve an unavailability goal of .001. That number was admittedly selected somewhat arbitrarily and industry feedback has suggested that a computer based system cannot meet this goal without relying on redundancy.
We have also required that the system continue to function during and following an earthquake. Our reasoning was that the operators may have the greatest need for the system during an earthquake as the effects of such an event will probably be felt plantwide and may result in considerable confusion in the control room.
Again, industry comment suggests that, by complying with seismic qualification criteria, certain desirable design features may have to be deleted. As a severe earthquake is a very low probability event at most plant sites, we must carefully balance the benefits to be gained through seismic qualification against possible losses in system capabilities which may also result.
We are sensitive to the possibility that, by applying too stringent design requirements to a system of this sort, we may make it impossible to implement a system that could substantially add to the operator's response capabilities during an accident. Industry must work together with the NRC to develop system requirements so that the system goals --both functional capability and performance reliability --can be optimized. Acoustic monitoring techniques have been used as part of vibration monitoring programs for large rotating machinery such as pumps and turbines. In most applications, vibration amplitude is monitored, with alarms being generated when amplitude signals indicate a dangerous operating condition. More sophisticated analysis techniques which cal be applied on-line are now being developed. If successful, these techniques may allow the identification of causes of equipment degradation, leading to better maintenance planning and improved equipment reliability.
At least one reactor vendor has developed an acoustic monitoring system for monitoring the integrity of the total primary system pressure boundary. Such a system has clear safety benefits. The rapid identification of the occurrence of a leak and its approximate location would enable operating personnel to take appropriate action to isolate the leak and thereby minimize its effects.
Noise Analysis
Traditionally, the NRC has focused its attention on event mitigation rather than prevention. Our regulations are aimed primarily at safety system designs and the performance of those systems; normal operating systems have not normally been the subject of review.
However, a review of nuclear power plant operating experience shows that many events occur --most of relatively minor significance --which result in reactor trip and, occasionally in actuation of emergency core cooling systems. Reliance on backup safety systems to mitigate minor transients is, in my view, undesirable as the risk of safety system failure is directly related to the rate of challenges to those systems. In addition, safety system action usually results in abrupt changes in process conditions and system response which can hender the operator's ability to cope with the event. Steps should be taken by the industry, particularly the utilities responsible for plant operation, to reduce safety system challenges through improvements in operating system performance.
There is instrumentation presently available or under development, most of which has been made possible through the introduction of low cost computers, which would help -the operator in early identifiction of equipment abnormalities, thereby preventing major equipment failures and consequent Noise analysis techniques may prove to be another useful tool for identifying impending process equipment failures. Extensive use has been made of noise measurements to identify core barrel motion and monitor the vibration of reactor internal s. Through work being performed for the Commission by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, baseline neutron noise spectra are being obtained at a number of different pressurized water reactor facilities. It is our hope that these spectra will be of use in the analysis of possible future operational problems at facilities of this type.
Oak Ridge has also developed a continuous on-line surveillance system for monitoring noise signals 9from a variety of nuclear power plant sensors. The system calculates the power spectral densities for the signals monitored as a function of time and, by using pattern recognition techniques, identifies changes in noise spectra.
While not yet feasible, on-line analyses of such changes could be used someday to detect degradation of plant equipment, making noise monitoring systems a powerful surveillance tool for the operator.
Through the cooperative efforts of the NRC and TVA, Oak Ridge personnel are presently installing a prototype surveillance system at the Sequoyah Nuclear Station with the objective of gaining a better understanding of the relationships between the spectra monitored and the status of the plant equipment and process variables. Over the past year, the Commission has taken upon itself the development of requirements with, in some instances, little industry involvement. This was necessary to speed implementation of plant modifictions. We recognize that such an approach is not without the risk of error. Operational problems are better addressed when industry purposes the design modifications, and NRC reviews and modifies where appropriate. The nuclear industry, particularly the utilities, must become more active in developing safety improvements --that will require a commitment of money and manpower.
Finally, the NRC must make some changes. Traditionally we have been skeptical about implementing some advanced technologies for safety purposes. Thus, we share some of the blame for the lack of progress in upgrading reactor design. But we, too, have learned from Three Mile Island and I believe we recognize that advanced techhologies can play an important role in making safety improvements.
